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ABSTRACT  
Characterizations of feminist identities are presented, represented and, arguably, 
misrepresented within current public debates and popular media. Issues of sameness 
and difference have come to the fore as both timely and politically relevant. This 
paper aims to address issues arising from engagement with feminisms, in particular 
those which we experience as 'other' but which, concurrently, resonate with many of 
our concerns. Conflicting views revolve around the viability of constructing stable 
political identities for women who elect to include the term 'feminist' in their self-
description. These debates become increasingly complex when contextualized within 
relative power positionings of knowledge production in differing arenas. Drawing on 
the literature around the legitimization of gender and political identities, the authors 
reflect in this paper on the possibilities of engaging with these identities, both in our 
capacity of 'others', but also as individuals whose theoretical positioning resonates 
with the issues under consideration. 
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TO BEGIN: WHO ARE WE? 
 
This article is the product of informal meetings and discussions between the four 
authors. The series of debates that ensued between us were borne out of discussions of 
the potential possibilities of forging workable political relations between Western and 
non-Western feminisms. In the course of these conversations the debate extended to 
questions of whether we can or should engage with multiplex strands of feminist 
thought within the broad category of feminism more generally and how such an 
engagement might be played out. Our discussions of the question put forward in the 
title became increasingly complex as the similarities and differences between the 
perspectives of each of the authors became apparent.  
 
Whilst we, the authors, would broadly describe ourselves as Western feminists, 
there are innumerable points of convergence and divergence between our theoretical 
standpoints. Moreover, we are similar and we are different along a number of fault 
lines. For example, two of the authors are in their twenties and two of the authors are 
in their forties. There are also a number of connections as well as differences between 
all four of the authors in terms of ethnic background. However, three of the authors 
would broadly describe themselves as white and one author would refer to herself as 
of mixed ‘race’. The ways in which aspects of our experiences intersect and diverge 
further illustrates this point. For example, we all work in psychology departments but 
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we are all at different stages in our careers.  Through our discussions of this question 
we became increasingly engaged with each other and concerned with understanding 
our resonances and differences. Our attempts to engage with the question proposed 
underscored the ways in which our attempts to engage with each other are always 
already framed within varying dimensions of similarity and difference.  
 
The question that we ask in the title has already received serious attention within 
the academic and feminist literature. However, given the range of views and the 
differing ways in which each of us could be represented, we found it productive to 
explore this complex subject further through the written medium. In this article we 
aim to address issues arising from engagement with feminisms, in particular those 
feminisms which we experience as ‘other’ but which, at the same time, resonate with 
many of our concerns and understandings. In engaging with this question, we aim to 
trace a path through the debates and highlight how we have sought to engage with 
these as a group rather than solely as individuals. 
 
 
FEMINIST IDENTITIES 
 
Characterizations of feminist identities are presented, represented and, arguably, 
misrepresented within current public debates and the popular media.  In spite of the 
many dominant discourses in our culture that conceptualize ‘feminist’ as a stable and 
essential identity, be it a favorable or (more often) an unfavorable one, feminism is 
not monolithic. The diversity of dialects of feminisms makes it difficult for us to 
conceptualize feminism in the singular at all (Hemmings, 2005).  To construct a 
watertight definition would be exclusionary whereas a definition with too few 
descriptions could render the term meaningless (Allwood and Wadia, 2002). 
Moreover, and particularly over the past decade, the tensions and conflicts between 
feminist positions have made it hard, if not impossible, to define not only what 
feminism is, but who a feminist might be.   
  
The increasing heterogeneity of feminist identities has developed not just as a 
continuum along the political spectrum, but in the form of differences - and often 
divisions - along generational, ideological and religious lines (e.g. Johnson, 2002).  
Moreover, many of these differences are constructed along dimensions of power (see 
for example Burns, 1999) and frequently expressed in terms of binary oppositions 
(e.g. white/black, heterosexual/lesbian, first world/third world, and so on). Neither 
‘white’ feminism nor ‘black’ feminism are essentialist categories (nor are they in 
opposition); rather, they are fields of contestation inscribed with discursive and 
material processes and practices in a post-colonial terrain (Brah, 1996, p. 111).  
Feminism is only ever prefixed by ‘white’ when it is being problematized: most of the 
time its whiteness is rendered invisible by its universalist pretensions (Young, 2000, 
p. 50). The various instantiations of feminism do not simply reflect the extent of 
diversity between women, but the power differentials and inequalities that exist 
therein (e.g. Byrne, 2003). As Sherna Berger Gluck and Daphne Patai (1991) argue, 
“we must not assume that gender unites women more powerfully than race and class 
divides them” (p.2).  
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The multiple positionings within feminism raise a number of questions, not least 
of which is how feminism can engage with relevant ‘each’ others.  Diane Richardson 
(1996) argues that variation is such that feminists have begun to locate alternate 
positionings within ‘feminism’ precisely as feminist ‘Others’.  Sue Wilkinson and 
Celia Kitzinger (1996) describe the almost paradoxical situation whereby “Western 
academic feminists, committed to the articulation of what is Other in relation to 
patriarchal male values, now have to confront the challenge of other Others for whom 
they themselves constitute a new hegemony, and in relation to whom they stand in 
positions of power and domination” (p.7).  The relationships between feminists 
around these issues at local, national and international levels have been so tense as to 
cause Lynne Segal (1999) to speak of “feminists even frightening each other” (p.9).  
 
Within this context, the theoretical and political difficulties of according 
authority to (other) feminisms, and the processes and discourses by which feminist 
behaviors and ideologies are constructed as legitimate and ‘appropriate’ (Ussher, 
1991) become relevant. There are conflicting views about the possibility of 
constructing recognizable and stable political identities for women who elect to 
include the term ‘feminist’ in their self-description.  
 
 
I AM ‘WOMAN’? 
 
One response to the issue of difference between feminisms has been the 
development of unifying or totalizing strategies. It is argued that unity amongst 
women is desirable and perhaps necessary for organizing political action (Young, 
1990). Woman as ‘individual’ has been constituted as the place where psychology and 
politics - psyche and citizen – become enmeshed.  This individual thus becomes 
crucial to the construction of and theorization of the political project of feminisms.    
 
However, the rubric of feminism includes prolific, fractured, sometimes 
contradictory identities, which reflect differing concerns of women who are variously 
positioned and constituted within particular social and cultural contexts (Hepburn, 
1999, 2000). A key point here is that the complex interweaving of gender with issues 
such as race and class calls into question the assumption that the category ‘woman’ 
provides a foundational grounding for fluid relations between feminists and women 
generally (see also Hekman, 2000). 
 
Judith Butler (1990), amongst others, suggests that the particular basis for 
identification between women, the unitary subject, can work to exclude those who do 
not fit certain conceptualizations of what constitutes the category of ‘woman’.  This 
can be seen in early feminist work, where theorizations reflected the concerns of 
specific kinds of women, positioned as white, heterosexual, able-bodied and middle 
class (e.g. Nicholson, 1990; Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 1997). In this way a unifying 
strategy may be undermined by its potential to create an excluded, subordinated other. 
As Dongxiao Qin (2004) points out, it is impossible for any one feminist self-theory 
to articulate an all-encompassing ‘truth’ about women as ‘truth’ is partial and 
culturally contingent. These analyses render questionable the assumption that the 
category of ‘woman’ in and of itself can provide a fixed, stable or essential relation 
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between feminisms. ‘When “identities” become pure....the potential for diverse and 
democratic collectivities is threatened’ (Caraway, 1992, p.1). 
 
However, global and eco-feminists (e.g. Howell, 1997; see also Mendoza, 2002) 
argue that refusing to engage with ‘other’ feminisms, or keeping them separate, is not 
an alternative. This is to ‘silence women’ and render invisible the cultural abuses of 
women around the world (Hodechenedel and Mann, 2003).  In emphasising the 
common humanity of all women, these feminists advocate the need to build 
international feminist links, ‘in order to influence public policy makers 
internationally, nationally and locally to embrace the principle of  “women’s rights as 
human rights”’ (Mbire-Barungi, 1999, p.435).  Elahe Povey (2001) suggests that this 
“could have a great impact not only on gender relations, but also on the process of 
democratisation and secularisation” (p. 44).   Proponents of this view have argued that 
“by promoting discourses of difference and identity, academic feminists have 
disunited and castrated the feminist movement” (Hodechenedel & Mann, 2003, p.6). 
 
 
WHO ARE ‘THEY’? 
 
The dimensions of gender, ‘race’, sexuality, social class, and culture indicate 
that feminists are different (and potentially ‘other’) along many dimensions of power 
or powerlessness. It is extremely difficult to tease apart the power dynamics between 
different feminisms, and hence the processes by which ‘other’ feminisms are 
constructed.  
 
They are ‘other’ 
 
Feminists such as Carol Gilligan (1982) have argued that the recognition of 
difference and otherness is not only undeniable, but also desirable.  Drawing on the 
Lacanian notion that ‘the self needs the other in order to be a self at all’ (emphasis 
added) (Sampson, 1993, p.153), others suggest that ‘otherness’ should be 
acknowledged and celebrated.  Similarly, Iris Young (1990) problematizes the 
assumption of necessary homogeneity, arguing that notions of unity, community and 
mutual identification have been deployed as alternatives to values engendered by 
capitalist patriarchal society. However, in attempts to accomplish this ideal, diversity 
between and within political groups has been suppressed and downplayed. Young 
suggests that from this framework, disparity in and between groups can be and has 
been conceptualized as a transgression of the notion of sisterhood. According to 
Young, this particular framework is born out of the lack of exploration of alternatives 
for feminist political activity. She proposes that acknowledging the presence of others 
need not rest on understanding another’s perspective; difference should be embraced 
and celebrated, and diverse groups allowed political representation (see also Squires, 
2001). 
 
They are ‘different’ 
 
Some feminists have criticized the process of ‘othering’ and the very notion of 
‘other’. They suggest that this notion should be replaced by the broader, and more 
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neutral, concept of ‘difference’ (see for example Carabine, 1996), mainly because the 
mere fact of representing the ‘other’ may disempower and distort, or at least patronize 
and essentialize, those who are othered.  This works to reinforce and reproduce the 
very structures of power and dominance which feminists should arguably be trying to 
undermine (c.f. Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 1997).   
 
As Hannah Frith (1996) has noted, “not all differences are equal” (p.181). This 
raises a number of questions. How are differences constructed and bounded?  And 
crucially, who defines which differences matter? (c.f. Burman, 1996).  Engagement 
with these questions might provide some insight as to why and how some feminisms 
come to be seen as not only different but as ‘other’.  These questions have practical 
implications.  For instance, Frith (1996) has highlighted the difficulties young women 
have in identifying with the multiple and shifting identities of feminism (c.f. Budgeon, 
2001).   
 
Hotly debated issues within feminisms, such as concerns about pornography and 
the politics of heterosexuality, have served as flashpoints. In research which explored 
women’s accounts of pornography (see Ciclitira, 1998), a participant (“Wendy”) 
voiced anger and disillusionment with feminism and its political activities. In her 
view, anti-porn feminism has created unnecessary categories and oppositions 
(including feminist/non- feminist):  
 
There’s loads of meetings, pornography, let’s, let’s do a march, ‘take back the 
night march’, and all this crap, in bloody Tottenham, go and march in bloody 
Hampstead, you cheeky buggers, and throw a brick through a pornography 
magazine window. They really think they’ve done something. You know I find 
that amusing, and I’m being cynical there. And they call, these so called 
feminists, I am not a feminist, and then again what is a feminist? But they’ve 
defined it, what it’s supposed to be, number one you’ve got to be a lesbian, 
number two you’ve got to be this, well it seems that way to me.  
 
In noting the difficulties that the category ‘feminism’ has caused her, Wendy 
reproduces stereotypical representations of what feminists are and do. In her view, 
middle-class white lesbian feminists marching in the UK against pornography and 
rape do not speak for a black working-class sex worker. Her own self-defined 
‘womanist’ stance suggested a personal dilemma of feeling politically aligned to 
women’s issues, and yet unable to accept certain perceived feminist dogmas and 
practices. Some black feminists gave up waiting for their experiences to be 
represented in mainstream feminist literature and adopted (like Wendy) a womanist 
approach (Wise, 1987) in which the issue of race is central (Collins, 2000; see also 
Boisnier, 2003). 
 
However, multiplicity is seen as especially important in the context of 
feminism(s) because the factors of ‘race’, sexuality, social class and culture make it 
difficult to define what is ‘same’ and what is ‘other’, and therefore to determine 
boundaries within feminisms.  Arguably, before we even ask ourselves which 
differences are most salient in the process of ‘othering’, we should be questioning the 
very notions of sameness and difference, challenging essential and exclusivist 
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‘us’/‘them’ categorizations (Bulbeck, 2000), and deconstructing absolute boundaries 
between ‘other’ feminisms. Michelle Fine and Judi Addelston (1996) have warned 
against explanations that use only ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, arguing that 
institutional power depends on using both discourses.  Indeed, the power of 
institutional narratives, as well as those of resistance, lies in the way they can avail 
themselves of manifold discourses.   
 
Kitzinger and Wilkinson (1997) similarly argue that both denying and affirming 
otherness is problematic.  To neglect otherness is to ‘homogenize women’s 
experience … straining to disregard ethnic, racial, class and other distinctions’ (p. 11), 
which are possibly more salient than shared gender (see e.g. Phoenix, 1994; Chantler, 
Burman, Batsleer & Bashir, 2001).  The differences between women are complex and 
not always transparent. Feminists in the West may appear to have freedom of speech, 
and compared to those living in non-democratic countries are able to speak out. But 
even a successful ‘white’ Westerner such as Susan Sontag (2001) became a target of 
fierce media criticism, death threats, and calls to have her citizenship revoked, after 
daring to offer a critical reading of the tragedy of 9/11.  
 
 
CONSTRUCTING ‘OTHER’ FEMINISMS 
 
These issues of sameness and difference have come to the fore as both timely 
and politically relevant.  In the current world climate, one of these differences is that 
between western and non-western cultures, with its associated religious and 
ideological differences - an abundance of ‘otherness’. This distinction is currently at 
the heart of heated controversy as to whether it is possible, or even desirable, to find a 
common ground between Western and non-Western feminists, especially where 
Islamic feminism is concerned.  Val Moghadam (2000) has argued that both the term 
and referents of ‘Islamic feminism’ are subjects of controversy and disagreement.  In 
this context, as was mentioned earlier, some feminists would dismiss the idea of 
engaging with ‘other’ feminisms.  For instance, Julie Burchill (2003) in the Guardian 
expressed skepticism about this particular conjunction, describing “women claiming 
to find feminism in Islam” as an example of “people who should know better 
searching for something (and often claiming to find it) where it never could be’ (p.5).  
 
Similar arguments have emerged around the question of whether feminism(s) 
are commensurable with particular religious affirmations. This is clearly evident in 
recent debate over the Vatican document entitled ‘on the collaboration of men and 
women in the Church and the world’. The document calls in to question feminist(s) 
views on gender equality arguing that feminism(s) disrupt the ‘natural’ family 
structure of mother and father, and sets up men and women as enemies. It specifically 
constructs radical feminists as problematic for attempting to equalize power 
differentials between men and women (Owen, 2004). For some the document 
represents a return to religious fundamentalism and a reinforcement of traditional 
gender roles (e.g. “Vatican Attacks Feminism,” BBC, 2004). Whilst for others the 
document represents a furthering of particular feminist aims in that the document calls 
for the presence of women in the workplace (e.g. “Head to Head,” BBC, 2004). 
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These debates become increasingly complex when contextualized within relative 
power positionings of knowledge production in differing arenas.   Shahrzad Mojab 
(2001) argues that Western feminist theory is in a state of crisis, since it is challenged 
by the continuation of patriarchal domination in the West despite legal equality 
between genders. She believes that it also overlooks oppressive gender relations in 
non-Western societies, and while rejecting Eurocentrism and racism, it endorses the 
fragmentation of women of the world into religious, ethnic and cultural entities with 
particularist agendas. In evaluating Islamic perspectives, Mojab argues that gender is 
a site of the exercise of power, which is unequally distributed and hierarchically 
organized. She concludes that patriarchy is not simply a problem of religion, nor can 
Islam be degenderized as if it were neutral as regards gender relations.   
 
Fatima Mernissi (1991) and Maria Holt (1996) have argued that Islam can 
function as a radical and empowering ideology, particularly when contrasted to 
Western perspectives. They differ in that Holt sees this ideology as requiring the 
repudiation of specific needs by women, while Mernissi attributes this requirement to 
the historical imposition of Western values rather than to the development of Islam 
itself.  For Holt, allegiance to Islam is presented as involving a voluntary abrogation 
of power by women. For Mernissi, it is not Islam itself that constructs difference, but 
the need to differentiate itself from the 'other’ (i.e. the West). In this sense, the West’s 
promotion of human rights in the Third World can be seen as a strategy for facilitating 
the circulation of Western goods and services (Majid, 1998).
1
 
 
 
(IN)CONCLUSIONS  
 
So where does this leave us in terms of ‘other’ feminisms? Current forms of 
feminisms are so varied that it is perhaps unsurprising to find so little agreement over 
this issue.  One side of the debate claims that the heterogeneity of feminism 
constitutes ‘a political tragedy’ (Hodechenedel and Mann, 2003, p. 6). The other 
asserts that ‘the ability to deal with difference is at the centre of feminism’s survival 
as a movement for social change’ (Bulbeck, 2000, p. 36) and that ‘difference –in all 
its multiplicity – might be understood as the true energising force in feminist theory, 
the source of its more radical and transformative discoveries’ (Johnson-Roullier, 
1997, p.1188). The conflicts seem to stem, in part, from contrasting 
conceptualisations of ‘womanhood’, with one side emphasising homogeneity’, 
sisterhood, and feminist solidarity (Caraway, 1992), with the other focusing on 
difference, otherness and dynamics of power.  We are stretched, it seems, between 
women’s sameness and women’s differences.   
 
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson (1990) contend that the solution lies in 
“replacing unitary notions of woman and feminine gender identity with plural and 
complexly constructed conceptions of social identity” (pp. 34-5).  This does not mean 
neglecting women’s or feminists’ similarities, but allowing, as de Lauretis (1986) 
says, for a “more inclusive feminist frame of reference” (p. 14).   As Lynne Segal 
(1999) has argued, solving the tensions and conflicts between feminisms may not 
always be possible, desirable, or even responsible.   
 
If I am woman, who are ‘they’?   
 
8 
Both gender and political identities become recognized, stabilized, and 
legitimized in manifold ways.  Perhaps the real questions are when and how this 
‘constructing of reality’ occurs. When do these identities become so resistant that they 
can produce political consequences?  What are these consequences?  Is this an 
interesting or useful focus for the construction of a political project?  Do we need to 
judge feminisms as ‘same’, ‘different’ or ‘other’ - effectively to evaluate them ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’?  Might it not be more productive to trace the path of feminisms as objects in 
and of themselves?  To ask how recognition as feminists occurs rather than to focus 
on whether or not it is appropriate?  For example, in what way might feminisms need 
to be part of a global protest? 
 
It may be more fruitful to recognize commensurabilities that exist in practice 
and to work with these, rather than questioning their legitimacy. Many of the worries 
which energized feminists in the 70’s persist, but the inequalities and divisions 
between women themselves have dramatically deepened (Segal, 2000). To avoid 
polarization in political debates is not easy but can be helpful (Bulbeck, 2000). 
Engaging with these as recognized political forces, where relevant to and resonant 
with our own work, might be more productive than to try to become gatekeepers. 
 
 
 
 
Endnote 
 
1
 Stephen Frosh (1997) has argued that it is fundamentalism not religion which is 
frightening, because of its certainty and its refusal to tolerate difference or opposition. 
Among the most characteristic features of fundamentalism is its gender politics, 
which considers women’s adherence to communal values and practices as crucial. It is 
particularly seductive because it offers solace to lost souls. Based on omnipotent 
fantasies and the denial of otherness, its refusal to acknowledge the existence of 
legitimate controls and alternative ways of being offers release from the pain of 
uncertainty. 
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